

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00  
INRE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W  
-----100621 121601Z /41  
P 121537Z APR 78  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8266  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION USNATO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 05496

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PARM  
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR EARLE'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 12, 1978  
(SALT TWO-1691)

- STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR EARLE  
- APRIL 12, 1978  
  
- I

MR. MINISTER:

TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO THE QUESTION OF  
LIMITATIONS ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS  
AND THE TIMING FOR INITIATING AND CARRYING OUT DIS-  
MANTLING AND DESTRUCTION OF THOSE ARMS IN EXCESS OF THESE  
LIMITATIONS.

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ON OCTOBER 13, 1977, THE UNITED STATES PROPOSED THAT  
THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BE  
REDUCED FROM 2400 TO 2160, BEGINNING JANUARY 1, 1980, AND  
THAT THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS OF MIRVED MISSILES BE LIMITED  
TO 1200 FROM THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE TREATY. THE  
UNITED STATES HAS ALSO PROPOSED, IN ARTICLE XI, THAT THE  
DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF SUCH ARMS WHICH ARE IN

EXCESS OF THE 2160 AGGREGATE LIMIT BE INITIATED BY JANUARY 1, 1980, AND COMPLETED NO LATER THAN SIX MONTHS THEREAFTER.

IN PRESENTING ITS PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 13, THE UNITED STATES ALSO TABLED LANGUAGE FOR PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE V WHICH REFLECTED EARLIER AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES ON THE CONCEPT OF INCLUDING IN THE TREATY AN AGGREGATE LIMITATION OF 1320 ON LAUNCHERS OF MIRVED MISSILES AND HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KM. IN SO DOING, THE UNITED STATES STATED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE 1320 LIMITATION IS CONTINGENT UPON THE SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE AGGREGATE AND MIRV LAUNCHER LIMITATIONS WHICH I HAVE JUST DISCUSSED.

IN CONTRAST, THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS PROPOSED THAT THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BE REDUCED FROM 2400 TO 2250, BEGINNING DECEMBER 30, 1980, AND THAT THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS OF MIRVED MISSILES BE LIMITED TO 1250 FROM THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE TREATY. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS ALSO PROPOSED THAT THE DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF SUCH ARMS WHICH WOULD BE IN EXCESS OF THE 2250 LIMIT BE COMPLETED WITHIN EIGHTEEN MONTHS AFTER DECEMBER 30, 1980.

THE PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCES IN THE POSITIONS OF THE  
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SIDES CONCERN (1) THE AGGREGATE NUMBER TO WHICH STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE REDUCED, (2) THE DATE FOR THE INITIATION OF REDUCTION OF SUCH ARMS, (3) THE AMOUNT OF TIME TO BE PERMITTED FOR DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF ARMS IN EXCESS OF THIS REDUCED LIMITATION, AND (4) THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS OF MIRVED MISSILES TO BE PERMITTED.

- III

THIS LAST POINT DESERVES PARTICULAR ATTENTION. TO DATE THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS OFFERED NO RATIONALE TO SUPPORT ITS PROPOSAL WITH REGARD TO THE LIMITATION ON LAUNCHERS OF MIRVED MISSILES. THE UNITED STATES, ON MARCH 9, PROVIDED DETAILED RATIONALE FOR ITS POSITION. IN PARTICULAR, IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT NEITHER SIDE HAS YET REACHED THE 1200 LEVEL PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES NOR WILL EITHER SIDE DO SO FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THUS THE SIDES HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH LOWER LIMITS ON THESE SYSTEMS AT NO COST IN TERMS OF DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION. MOREOVER, AGREEMENT TO AN AGGREGATE NUMBER OF 1200 RATHER THAN 1250 MIRV LAUNCHERS WOULD BE MORE CONSISTENT WITH THE STATED OBJECTIVE OF THE SIDES TO

TAKE MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC  
OFFENSIVE ARMS. THIS IS ALSO CONSISTENT WITH THE RE-  
PEATED SOVIET VIEW THAT ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH  
MIRVS ARE THE MOST DESTABILIZING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.  
THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE LOWER  
AGGREGATE OF 1200 WOULD SERVE EQUALLY THE COMMON INTEREST  
OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES.

- IV

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EXDIS, USSALTTWO

WITH REGARD TO THE AGGREGATE LIMITATION, THE SOVIET  
DELEGATION, ON MARCH 30, STATED THAT ITS PROPOSED LIMIT  
OF 2250 IS BASED ON "CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF THE  
RELEVANT FACTORS OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AND IS AIMED  
AT STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC STABILITY AND ENSURING EQUAL  
SECURITY OF THE SIDES." THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT  
THE INTERESTS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY AND EQUAL SECURITY  
CAN BETTER BE SERVED AT THE LOWER LEVEL OF 2160 STRATEGIC  
OFFENSIVE ARMS THAN AT THE HIGHER LEVEL PROPOSED BY THE  
SOVIET UNION. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHY  
THE SOVIET DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT STRATEGIC STABILITY  
CANNOT BE STRENGTHENED AND EQUAL SECURITY CANNOT BE  
MAINTAINED AT THE LOWER LEVEL WHICH HAS BEEN PROPOSED BY  
THE UNITED STATES.

ALSO IN ITS STATEMENT OF MARCH 30, THE SOVIET  
DELEGATION STATED THAT "THERE IS A DIRECT AND VERY  
SUBSTANTIAL INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN THE DATE FOR  
INITIATING REDUCTIONS OF THE 2400 AGGREGATE LEVEL AND THE

RESULTS OF CONSIDERATION BY THE SIDES OF THE ISSUES INCLUDED IN THE PROTOCOL." THE SOVIET SIDE ARGUES THAT ONLY AFTER RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE SECRET

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PROTOCOL WILL IT BECOME POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHICH STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SHOULD BE DISMANTLED OR DESTROYED.

THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT AGREE WITH THIS VIEW. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SHOULD BE TIED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON SUCH ARMS. IF SUCH A RATIONALE WERE TO BE ACCEPTED, IT WOULD BECOME IMPOSSIBLE TO PROCEED WITH MEANINGFUL REDUCTIONS SO LONG AS NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WERE STILL IN PROGRESS.

MOREOVER, THE UNITED STATES NOTES THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ALREADY BEEN ABLE TO MAKE SOME PRELIMINARY DECISIONS ABOUT WHICH SYSTEMS TO REDUCE. IN THIS REGARD, THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS INDICATED THAT HEAVY BOMBERS WILL CONSTITUTE THE MAIN PORTION OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE REDUCED IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE 2400 LEVEL AND THAT ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS WILL CONSTITUTE THE MAIN PORTION OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE REDUCED IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE LOWER LEVEL.

AS FOR THE TIME REQUIRED TO DISMANTLE OR DESTROY ARMS IN EXCESS OF THE REDUCED AGGREGATE LIMITATION, THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS ARGUED THAT EIGHTEEN MONTHS IS THE "MINIMUM PERIOD OF TIME NECESSARY FOR DISMANTLING A LARGE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS." THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS ALSO CITED LIMITATIONS ON RESOURCES AND UNFAVORABLE CLIMATIC CONDITIONS AS PART OF ITS RATIONALE FOR A LONGER PERIOD OF TIME FOR DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION.

HERE AGAIN, THE UNITED STATES FINDS THE SOVIET SECRET

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RATIONALE UNPERSUASIVE. IN REVIEWING THE RECENT HISTORY OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, IT IS APPARENT THAT WHEN A SIDE HAS HAD THE WILL TO MAKE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH SYSTEMS IT HAS BEEN ABLE TO DO SO. IT IS THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES THAT RAPID REDUCTION OF SUCH ARMS CAN ALSO BE ACCOMPLISHED IF A SIDE HAS THE WILL TO DO SO.

- V

MR. MINISTER, I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR RESPONSE TO THE  
CONSIDERATIONS I HAVE SET FORTH TODAY. EARLE

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